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IN 7HF SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE Or UTAH
BRAY LINES INCORPORATED,
Case No. 20756
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
UTAH CARRIERS, INC., a Utah,
corporation, and G. EUGENE
ENGLAND, an individual,
Defendants/Appellants.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, G. Eugene England, appeals from a decision of
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, in which
the Court granted the Respondent's Motion For Summary Judgment
against the Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether Summary Judgment was appropriate in a case wherein
an individual Defendant had signed a guarantee for payment of a
corporate obligation, when defenses of failure of consideration
and unjust enrichment were raised, both in the pleadings and by
affidavit and no contrary evidence was presented at the hearing
for Summary Judgment and no discovery had yet been undertaken by
the parties.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower Court heard argument on Respondent's Motion For
Summary Judgment on April 15, 1985.

The Court ruled that in

assuming the facts in a light most favorable to the Defendants,
it was the Courts opinion and under the law applicable to the

case, the Defendant (singular) haD no recognizable defense and
granted the Motion For Summary Judgment on May 16, 1985.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower Court ruling,
vacating the Summary Judgment against the individual Defendant
and allowing the matter, with respect to him, to proceed to trial
on the merits.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In April of 1978, the Respondent, Bray Lines Incorporated,
hereinafter referred to as Bray Lines, was a corporation engaged
in the interstate trucking business and also ICC authority to
haul various types of loads in various areas of the country.

In

April of 1978, Bray Lines was approached by Duane Barker, who was
at that time, President of a trucking company known as
International Contract Carriers.

In that capacity, Barker

entered into negotiations with Bray Lines for the purchase of its
authority.

Barker was advised by counsel for Bray Lines, that

Bray Lines could not sell the authority directly to an existing
company, but had to sell to a new entity, in which Barker
ostensibly had no interest.

(See Record on Appeal, Affidavit of

Duane Barker)
Pursuant to these discussions, Barker established a new
entity, known as Utah Carriers, Inc., a Utah corporation and one
of the Defendants in the case below.

Although Barker would be

operating the company and in effect, would have the controlling
interest therein, for the purposes of consummating the sale, he
could not be shown as an Officer, Director or Shareholder.
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Therefore, the other co-Defendant in the case below, G. Eugene
England, the father-in-law of Duane Barker was approached by all
of the parties to be utilized for the purpose of signing the
documents as an officer of Utah Carriers.
All of the parties to the transaction knew that England was
in fact, a disinterested party, whose only involvement was as a "straw man" to form Utah Carriers to meet the requirements of the
ICC for the sale of authority.

(See Record on Appeal, Complaint)

The negotiations came to fruition, and on April 12, 1978,
Bray Lines sold its authority to Utah Carriers (See Record on
Appeal, Complaint) for the sum of $309,438,39.

The Respondent

required that England sign a guarantee for said Agreement, which
was evidenced by a Promissory Note.

Affixed to the guarantee, in

the handwriting of one of the Officers of the Plaintiff, are the
words, "Duane Barker is the owner, Eugene England's son-in-law".
(See Record on Appeal, Guarantee attached to Plaintiff's
Complaint)

Following the consummation of the arrangement, G.

Eugene England never exercised any authority in Utah Carriers,
was never compensated in any way from Utah Carriers and was not
compensated in any way for signing as a guarantor the Note which
secured the payment obligation, by either Utah Carriers or by
Bray Lines.

He was never given stock in the company and received

no dividends or any other remunerations (See Record on Appeal,
Affidavit of Duane Barker).
In 1980, the trucking industry in the United States was
deregulated, which had the effect of making interstate carrier
authority much more available to anyone who made an application
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for it.

In this particular case, it had the effect of rendering

authority, which at one time had been worth over $300,000.00
virtually useless.

Deregulation also had an adverse impact on

Defendant Utah Carriers, in that many other small carriers
entered the competitive market and Utah Carriers fell on hard
financial times.

As a net result of these problems, Utah

Carriers became financially impotent and unable to pay the total
obligation to Bray Lines, although they had paid in excess of
$250,000.00 on said obligation.
In May of 1984, Bray Lines brought suit against both Utah
Carriers as a corporation and G. Eugene England for the balance
of the Note in the sum of $44,556.39.

The Defendants filed an

answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, alleging inter alia failure of
consideration with respect to the Defendant England, and, also
the unconscionability and unforceability of the Agreement due to
the deregulation and the equitable defense of unjust enrichment
on behalf of both parties if the amount were to be enforced. {See
Record on Appeal, Answer of Defendants)

No other discovery, in

the form of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions or
Depositions was taken in the ensuing months and in March of 1985,
Bray Lines filed for Summary Judgment.
Both parties submitted Memorandums to the Court, with
respect to the adviseability of granting Summary Judgment.

The

Respondent submitted no Affidavit in support of its position, but
relied soley on its Complaint and the answer on file.

The

Appellant's submitted not only a Memorandum, but an Affidavit of
Duane Barker in support of its position that Summary Judgment was
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not appropriate.
A hearing was held on April 15, 1985, in which both parties
argued their positions from the Memorandum, but no additional
evidence was taken by the Court, other than that found in the
file. (See Record on Appeal, Minute Entry of Proceedings, April
15, 1985)

Based upon the evidence submitted, the Court granted

Summary Judgment as against both Defendants, finding that both
Defendants had no recognizable defense to the action.

It is from

that decision that the individual Defendant, G. Eugene England
appeals.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial Court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion For
Summary Judgment, in that there were geniune issues of fact and
law with respect to the individual Defendants claim of lack of
consideration and that Plaintiff's presented no evidence, other
than the allegation contained in its Complaint to the contrary
and therefore, the Court was arbitrary in granting Summary
Judgment without further discovery and without allowing the case
to proceed on its merits.
ARGUMENT
This Court has long taken the position that any summary
proceeding which is dispositive of a lawsuit, should be viewed
with great caution, so that a party whose cause night have merit,
is not deprived of the right to access to the Court for the
enforcement of rights to redress wrong. (McBride v. Jones, 615
P.2d 432 (Utah 1980)
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Rule 56c of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
Summary Judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
Depositions, Answers to Interrogatories and Admissions on file,
together with Affidavits, if any, show that there are no geniune
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law.
What is clear in this case, is that there is a dirt of any
evidence in the file to allow a Judge to reach the conclusion
that there was no geniune issue as to any material facts, with
respect to the individual Defendant.

The only thing the file

contained in this case, at the time the lower Court rendered its
Summary Judgment decision, was an unverified Complaint, an
Answer, two Memorandums presented by each party and an Affidavit
presented by the Defendants.

There were no Depositions, Answers

to Interrogatories or Admissions on file to assist the Court in
its determination.

Nor was any oral testimony taken at the time

of the Summary Judgment hearing.
This Court has recently said, in the case of Gad v, Olsen,
685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984), that a Motion For Summary Judgment can
only be granted when there are no geniune issue as to any
material fact and even assuming the facts as asserted by the
party moved against to be true, that the party could not prevail.
In this case, Plaintiff's brouaht suit against both a corporate
and an individual Defendant on essentially a Promissory Note,
alleging a default of the payments thereon.
In all cases involving the enforcement of Promissory Notes
and other negotiable instruments, the equitable defenses of
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unjust enrichment, unconscionability and more particularly in
this case, the failure of consideration are valid defenses, which
if factually supported, can prevent the enforcement of the
obligation.

(See 12 Am Jur 2d Bills & Notes §215-254) In this

case, the only evidence the Court had before it, at the time of
Summary Judgment with respect to the individual Defendant was,
that there was indeed a failure of consideration with respect to
him.

There was no indication that he had received any

remuneration from either the Plaintiff or the corporate entity
for his participation.

The evidence was that he was merely

acting as a stand in for his son-in-law to effect a transfer of
authority.

The evidence at the time of the Summary Judgment was

that all of the parties knew that his involvement was merely as a
"straw man" and that they were really dealing with a corporate
entity, Utah Carriers, and an individual named Duane Barker.
Defendant asserts that even it there had been contrary
evidence presented by the Plaintiff's at the time of the Summary
Judgment hearing, either through Interrogatories, Admissions or
Affidavits, that this would certainly be a litigable issue and a
factual dispute which would have to be resolved at a hearing on
the merits and certainly would fall far short of achieving the
requirement of Summary Judgment that there were no material
issues of fact to be resolved.
The Judge's error is even more compelling in this case
however, because there was no evidence presented at all by the
Plaintiff's either through documents or testimony to counter the
individual Defendant's defense or the Affidavit.

In that
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instance, very clearly, the Defendant had the right to pursue his
defense in a trial on the merits and net be treated in a summary
manner, as he was in this case.

What Defendant believes happened

in this case, is supported by the initial inconsistent ruling by
the Court on April 15, 1985.

The Defendant believes that the

Court looked at the primary defense raised on behalf of the
corporate Defendant, that deregulation rendered the ICC authority
virtually useless therefore, the underlying Note could not be
enforced, and found that that defense, as a matter of law, could
not be recognized and in fact, so stated in its initial Minute
Entry of April 15, 1985, referring to the Defendant (singular) as
having no recognizable defense.

The Court did not address the

defenses raised by the individual Defendant and therefore,
counsel sought a clarification.

(See counsel's letter, attached

as Exhibit 3)
On May 16, 1985, in a second Minute Entry, the Court
clarified its intent and that was that the Judgment be entered
against both the Defendants, but did not clarify that it found
that, the defenses raised by the individual Defendant were not
recognizable under the law.

Defendant agrees that the Court

failed to make this comment because in fact, the Court could not
make such a finding given the present status of the ]aw of equity
and under the facts as the Court had them in the file at the time
of the Summary Judgment hearing.
This Court has an obligation to allow litigants to proceed
on an orderly basis with a resolution of their disputes on the
merits, unless there are simply no facts in dispute and the law
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is clear.

In this case, that is not the situation.

The facts

are in dispute and the law allows the defenses raised, if
factually supported, and the individual Defendant should have the
opportunity to present his case in the context of a trial on the
merits.
CONCLUSION
The instant case is not one in which Summary Judgment is
appropriate.

The Court erred in finding such against the

individual Defendant, as there were geniune issues of fact, which
were in dispute based upon the status of the pleadings at the
time and the Court is not allowed to infer other facts which are
not present in a Summary Judgment proceeding.

Because the Court

over-reached in granting Summary Judgment, the Defendant
respectfully submits, with respect to the individual Defendant,
G. Eugene England, that the decision of the lower Court be
reversed and that the case be allowed to proceed on the merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2MJ-^ff?^f

JOHNTL

August, 1985.

CAINE

Attorney for Defendants
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Assuming the facts in the light most favorable to

the defendants, it is the Court's opinion that under the law
applicable to this case, the defendant has no recognizable
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Honorable James S. Sawaya
District Court Judge
240 East 400 Sout-h
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Bray Lines v. Utah Carriers
and G. Eugene Enqland
Civil No. C84-2634

Dear Judge Sawaya:
I received your minute entry ruling concerning the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment which was heard on April 15, 1985. I
am somewhat confused as to whether or not your ruling goes only
to Utah Carriers or to the defendant England. By it's terms, you
have indicated that the defendant, singular, has no recognizable
defense. As ycu recall, however, there are two defendants, the
corporate defendant, Utah Carriers, and England. If, in fact,
you arc granting summary judgment only to Utah Carriers then I
have no difficulty with the decision. If, however, you 5re
extending the summary judgment to England, perhaps a motion to
reconsider or tc clarify would be in order.
I would remind the court that the only evidence before the court
at the time of the motion concerning Mr. England's involvement
was that he had guaranteed the note. The plaintiff never alleged
in it's complaint or by any affidavit that his guarantee was
necessary for the extension of credit to the company and the
affidavit submitted by Duane Barker indicates that. England was
never really a functioning officer of the corporation nor did he
receive any financial benefits for what he did.
It would seem tc me that under these circumstances, the case with
respect to England should be tried on the merits, but if the
court intended the summary judgment to go to both I need tc know
that.

EXHIBIT 3
I would appreciate the court advising me a*- to it's desires xn
this natter.

JTC/stn
ccz

Michael Mohrman

